

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ACDA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04
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SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 IO-13 DHA-02 TRSE-00 EB-07 NEA-10
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R 141301Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3068

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

I TEPSXAMEMBASSY PARIS 4783

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 0618

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UR US CH

SUBJECT: IMEMO ANALYST ON 1977 PERSPECTIVES

REF: MOSCOW 0294 (NOTAL)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN JAN 12 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFFS,

IMEMO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CHIEF BYKOV:

--THOUGHT CARTER FOREIGN POLICY TEAM IS THE
KING AN ACTIVIST PRESIDENT WOULD PICK, WITH HIGHEST MARKS
TO NEW MEN SOVIETS HAVE PREVIOUSLY MET

--SAW NO POTENTIAL HOTSPOTS IN RELATIVELY PLACID WORLD SCENE
INVOLVE U.S. AND USSR IN CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD DISTRUB
PRIORITY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE RAPID PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL;

--DISCOUNTED REVIVIFIED "IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE"

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ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DE FACTO "BENIGN NEGLECT" OF EAST-
WEST ISSUES AS OBSTACLES TOKIND OF EAST-WEST PROGRESS
USSR WANTS; AND

--WAS BEARISH ON PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT IN
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHILE IDENTIFYING BORDER AND
TROOPS AS FIRST ITEMS ON AGENDA OF PRACTICAL PROGRESS
TOWARD "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE." END SUMMARY.

2. DURING JAN 12 CALL BY EMBOFFS AT INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MEMO), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT CHIEF OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH BYKOV TOUCHED ON NEW TEAM IN WASHINGTON, DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVES FOR 1977, AND CHINA.

3. THE MEN PERESIDENT-ELECT CARTER HAS CHOSEN IN FOREIGN POLICY AREA ARE EXACTLY THE KIND AN "ACTIVIST" PRESIDENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO CHOOSE, BYKOV SAID: TREMENDOUSLY EXPERIENCED AND TECHNICALLY CAPABLE. ON INDIVIDUALS:

--THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED NOT ONLY BY SECRETARY-DESIGNATE VANCE'S RECORD AS A MANAGER AND A DIPLOMAT, AND ESPECIALLY HIS FAMILIARITY WITH BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND DEFENSE ISSUES, BUT ALSO BY HIS STATEMENTS ON THE PRIORITY OF ARMS CONTROL AND THE DESIRABILITY OF FURTHER PROGRESS IN U.S.--SOVIET RELATIONS. THEY ALSO RECALL HIS IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE IN DISCUSSIONS DURING HIS LAST VISIT HERE (WHICH BYKOV HAD ATTENDED AT THE USA INSTITUTE).

-- SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BROWN IS A REAL EXPERT IN BOTH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND HIS STATEMENTS ON THE NEED TO CONTROL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE A POSITIVE SIGN.

--SORENSEN'S IS PERHAPS THE MOST MYSTERIOUS OF THE NEW APPOINTMENTS. HE IS OBVIOUSLY A CAPABLE MAN, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT AS YET TO RELATE HIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TO THE DEMANDS OF HIS NEW JOB OF RUNNING A LARGE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. BYKOV HAD JUST REREAD CONFIDENTIAL

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HIS BOOK ON THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND FOUND ONLY A FEW PASSAGES INDICATING PREOCCUPATION WITH INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS. AT THE SAME TIME, HIS EXPERIENCE WITH WHITE HOUSE-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS WILL PROBABLY SERVE HIS WELL IN HIS NEW CAPACITY, LIKE VANCE AND BROWN, HE TOO HAD BEEN TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO LECTURE

--BLUMENTHAL WAS PERHAPS THE MOST "EXCITING" OF THE NEW APPOINTEES, BYKOV SAID, AND THE SOVIETS ARE STRUCK AT HOW SIMILAR HIS BACKGROUND IS TO KISSINGER'S.

--BRZEZINSKI'S IDEAS HAVE SHOWN A SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION OVER THE YEARS, FROM THE DAYS WHEN HE CONCENTRATED ON SHARP "IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE" WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD HIM HAVE SIMILARLY EVOLVED, AS HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN PRESS TREATMENT. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO NOTED HIS STATED CONCEPTION OF THE NSC POSTAS PRIMARILY COORDINATIVE, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY PREVIOUS INCUMBENTS INCLUDING KISSINGER HAVE MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS AT THE BEGINNING.

--THE STRESS ON VICE PRESIDENT - ELECT MONDALE'S
FOREIGN POLICY ROLE HAS ALSO BEEN STRIKING, BYKOV CONCLUDED.
THE SOVIETS REMEMBERD HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW WITH
PLEASURE: ALTHOUGH HIS SPECIFIC VIEWS HAD SOMETIMES
REFLECTED HIS PRIMARILY CONGRESSIONAL BACKGROUND, HE HAD
DEMONSTRATED GREAT ENTHUSIASM AND ATTRACTIVE INCLINATIONS ON
FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

4. TURNING TO DIPLOMATIC PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW YEAR,
BYKOV SAID HE AND OTHER SOVIETS ARE HOPEFUL THAT RAPID
PROGRESS IN SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD NOW BE POSSIBLE, AFTER THE "FREEZE" WHICH MARKED
1976. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS ARE RIPE FOR
PROGRESS, BOTH IN ARMS CONTROL AND IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS GENERALLY

.
IN A SENSE, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE THE FIRST
"NORMAL" ADMINISTRATION THE U.S. HAS HAD IN FIFTEEN
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YEARS, AND WORLD CONDITIONS HAD MUCH CHANGED, AND FOR
THE BETTER, IN THE INTERIM. LOOKING OUT OVER THE WORLD,
HE SAW NO SITUATION LIABLE TO PROBOKE CONFRONTATION OR
STRESS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT
RUN, EVEN GIVEN ALL THE EXISTING COMPLEXITIES. THIS WAS
TRUE, SPECIFICALLY, IN BOTH THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA. THE MIDDLE EAST IS SO COMPLEX THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 0618

TO BE OPTIMISTIC, SINCE THE SITUATION CAN CHANGE SO RAPIDLY, BUT CONDITIONS "ARE BETTER THAN EVER BEFORE" FOR PROGRESS TOWARD STABILITY. SOUTHERN AFRICA IS ALSO COMPLEX, BUT, FOLLOWING THE "SOLUTION" IN ANGOLA, THERE ARE SOME PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT, AND THERE IS CERTAINLY NO REASON FOR U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION. AND, THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

5. THEREFORE, BYKOV CONCLUDED, THE SOVIET UNION SEES EVERY REASON TO PRESS AHEAD FOR RENEWED PROGRESS WITH THE U.S., BEGINNING WITH SALT, AND WE WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THERE IS CERTAINLY NO INTENTION ON THE USSR'S PART OF PLACING OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF U.S. PARTICIPATION DURING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S BREAKING-IN PERIOD BY
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ANY KIND OF TEST OR CHALLENGE.

6. ASKED WHETHER HE SAW ANY "NATURAL" OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS, BYKOV SAID HE DID NOT. IT DID NOT APPEAR TO HIM THAT THE STRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ("AS YOU CALL IT") WHICH HAD BEEN APPARENT DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN NEED HINDER PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD OR IN RELATIONS GENERALLY. "IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE" BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS WOULD OF COURSE GO ON--IT WAS PART OF LIFE--BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS PRACTICAL PROGRESS, RATHER THAN "THEOLOGY," AND LEADERS TEND TO BECOME MORE PRACTICAL WHEN THEY SIT DOWN AT THEIR DESKS. HE ALSO DID NOT BELIEVE THAT INCREASED EMPHASIS ON NORTH-SOUTH AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NEED PRODUCE DIMINISHED EMPHASIS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. AS MCGEORGE BUNDY HAD ONCE PUT IT, THE WORLD IS MOVING TOWARD MORE "BOTH/AND" AND TOWARD LESS "EITHER/OR". ADND, SPECIFICALLY, TWO "OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" WILL ASSURE CONTINUING HIGH PRIORITY TO EAST-WEST ISSUES. FIRST, ARMS CONTROL INVOLVES THE WHOLE WORLD. SECOND, THERE ARE SO MANY POINTS OF POTENTIAL TENSION AROUND THE GLOBE THAT NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES CANNOT, OVER THE LONG TERM, BE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED WITHOUT EAST-WEST INPUT IN GENERAL,

AND U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN PARTICULAR. SO HE HAD NO FEAR OF "BENIGN NEGLECT" FROM THE U.S.

7. ASKED ABOUT CHINA, BYKOV SAID NO REASONABLE MAN WOULD MAKE PREDICTIONS AT THIS POINT, SINCE THE SITUATION IS BOTH COMPLEX AND OBSCURE, AND OBVIOUSLY THERE WILL BE FURTHER CHANGES. NEVERTHELESS, HE DID NOT FORESEE "MAJOR CHANGES" IN THE NEAR FUTURE, ESPECIALLY NOT IN FOREIGN POLICY. ONE MAJOR REASON IS THAT CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION OVER THE PAST DECADE, IN THE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS AND ELSEWHERE, HAVE GIVEN THE CHINESE MORE INCENTIVES FOR MODERATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT A RETURN TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE GOOD RELATIONS WHICH PREVAILED "A LONG TIME AGO NOW," AND, ALTHOUGH "OF COURSE THE DOOR TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IS ALWAYS OPEN ON OUR SIDE," NEITHER DO THEY EXPECT MUCH EARLY MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION FROM THE CHINESE.

8. ASKED WHETHER USE OF THE TERM "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" DID NOT IMPLY THAT CHINA HAS CEASED TO BE A "SOCIALIST" STATE FOR THE SOVIETS, BYAKOV SAID THE SOVIETS USE IT BECUASE IT WAS WHAT THE CINESE CLAIM THEY ARE OFFERING, AND THE SOVIETS WANT PRACTICAL PROGRESS. BREZHNEV HAS STATED THE SOVIET POSITION IN THESE TERMS FOR THIS REASON. IN GENERAL, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF "THEOLOGY" IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT THERE ARE A GREAT MANY PRACTICAL ISSUES --THE BORDER, TROOPS--ON WHICH PROGRESS COULD AND MUST BE MADE BEFORE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES CAN BE ADDRESSED. IN THE MEANTIME, "NO ONE HERE CALLS CHINA A SOCIALIST STATE, BUT NO ONE SAYS IT HAS CEASED TO BE A SOCIALIST STATE EITHER."

9. COMMENT. WITH SOMEWHAT GREATER "CONCEPTUAL" OVERLAY, BYKOV SEEMS TO BE DELIVERING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MESSAGE AS BOVIN (REFTEL): THE SOVIETS WANT TO MOVE FAST ON ARMS CONTROL WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND DO NOT WANT OTHER ISSUES TO GET IN THE WAY OF THIS INITIAL PRIORITY EFFORT. ALSO LIKE BOVIN, BYKOV WAS BEARISH ON PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. UNLIKE BOVIN, HOWEVER, BYKOV WOULD HATE TO SEE EAST-WEST ISSUES LOSE THEIR RECENT PREEMINENCE ON THE GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC AGENDA. ON THIS POINT, WE SUSPECT HE IS ALSO MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT OPINION.
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